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Understanding the Resurgence of Traditional Authorities in Post-apartheid South 
Africa 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 42 (1): 1–14. (2015) 
Andrew Ainslie (University of Reading) and Thembela Kepe (University of Toronto and 
Rhodes University) 
ABSTRACT: 
Drawing their power not from the ballot box but from a supposedly ancient wellspring of 
power, hereditary traditional authorities in postcolonial Africa have frequently posed 
challenges for incoming ‘democratic’ governments. The situation in post-apartheid South 
Africa is no different. However contentious their role under the colonial and apartheid 
systems of government was, the Constitution of the new South Africa (1996) recognised 
traditional authorities and afforded them opportunities for a political resurgence. This paper 
reviews the changing status of traditional authorities in the Eastern Cape Province over the 
twenty years since 1994. It explores the resurgence of the chiefs in relation to the 
consolidation of both democratic processes and of emergent, neo-patrimonial modes of 
government. It briefly considers the role of traditional authorities in three key and closely 
related spheres, namely the institution of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders, the 
question of how gender is handled by and within traditional institutions, and the continuing 
challenges of land administration and development in rural areas. In all these spheres, and in 
the face of real opposition, the voice and influence traditional authorities have emerged 
stronger than ever. We conclude by suggesting that as they are drawn deeper into 
governance and have to play a formal role in addressing the myriad institutional challenges, 
new questions will and should be asked about the status and influence of traditional 
authorities, and their substantive contribution to democracy in South Africa. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Hereditary traditional authorities 1  in postcolonial Africa have frequently experienced 
uncertainties with regard to their institutional and constitutional status in young African 
democracies.2 This is in part because they draw much of their power not from the ballot box, 
                                                          
1 Ntsebeza distinguishes between ‘tribal authorities’, 'traditional leaders’ and ‘traditional authorities': L. 
Ntsebeza, ‘Land Rights and Democratization: Rural Tenure Reform in South Africa’s Former Bantustans’, 
Transformation, 52 (2003), pp. 68–95. See p. 92, footnote 3. We focus here on chiefs and kings and explicitly 
exclude headmen from our analysis.  
2  P. Nugent, Africa since Independence (London, Palgrave, 2004); N. Kleist, ‘Modern Chiefs: Tradition, 
Development And Return Among Traditional Authorities In Ghana’, African Affairs, 110/441, (2011), pp. 629–
647; F. B. Nyamnjoh, ‘Chieftaincy and the negotiation of might and right in Botswana democracy’ in Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, 21, 2 (2003), pp. 233–50; H. M. Kyed and L. Buur, ‘Introduction: traditional 
authority and democratization in Africa’ in L. Buur and H. M. Kyed (eds.), State Recognition and 
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but from a different, supposedly more ancient wellspring of signification and power. The 
post-1994 situation in South Africa is in many respects no different.3  
 The legacy of chiefs in the South Africa is mixed. Although some traditional 
authorities were instrumental in the struggle against colonialism during the 19th century and 
against segregation and apartheid during the twentieth century, many traditional authorities 
were complicit in the elaboration of apartheid policies and legislation in rural, especially 
Bantustan, areas in the period since the 1950s.4 Hendricks and Ntsebeza, two staunch critics 
of the resurgence of traditional authorities, stuck to first principles when they argued that the 
chieftaincy was ‘inherently undemocratic…[since] chiefs are not elected by popular vote but 
imposed on the basis of ascription and lineage and [because] there is very little chance of 
women becoming traditional authorities’.5 However, contrary to the popular expectation that 
after 1994 traditional authorities would atrophy and slowly disappear, their spokespeople 
have become increasingly assertive and their resurgence over the two decades since 1994 is 
clearly evident. 
 We argue that the project to institutionalise democracy in South Africa has taken 
place on terrain far more complex than a binary opposition between modern urban democrats 
and traditional rural despots and their respective supporters.6 In particular, we argue that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn For Traditional Authorities? (New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), pp. 1–28. 
3 L. Ntsebeza, ‘Traditional Authorities and Democracy: Are We Back to Apartheid?’ in G. Ruiters (ed.), The 
Fate of the Eastern Cape. History, Politics and Social Policy (Scottsville, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 
2011). 
4 F. Hendricks, The Pillars of Apartheid: Land Tenure, Rural Planning and the Chieftaincy (Uppsala, Uppsala 
University, 1990); J. Peires, ‘Traditional leaders in purgatory: local government in Tsolo, Qumbu and Port St 
Johns, 1999–2000,’ African Studies 59, 1 (2000), pp. 97–114. 
5 F. Hendricks and L. Ntsebeza, ‘The Chieftaincy System is Rooted in Apartheid’, Mail & Guardian, 18 Feb 
2000. 
6 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1996); T.A. Koelble and E. LiPuma, ‘Traditional Leaders and the Culture of 
Governance in South Africa,’ Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and 
Institutions 24,1 (2011), pp. 5–29. Richard Sklar goes so far as to argue that ‘…whether embedded within a 
constitution or merely exercised informally, traditional rule tends to complement, sustain and legitimate the 
modern state rather than undermin[e] it. Mixed government implies cooperative interaction among distinct and 
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resurgence of traditional authority lies in the opportunities that opened up with the 
simultaneity of the global neo-liberal economic shifts of the 1990s and the complex re-
assertion of African identity politics. Identity politics in this context include, among other 
things, an affirmation of indigenous cultural practice, the assertion of gender equality and 
strident calls for the return of land to African ownership. But the resurgence should also be 
situated within the realpolitik of shifting alliances and multi-layered, political-economic 
interests that have manifested in struggles around development at local, provincial and 
national levels of the ANC-led government.7 Given that this is a review paper, and that these 
are wide-ranging issues, in the substantive sections that follow we briefly review just three 
issues that we think help us to understand the resurgence, with particular reference to the 
Eastern Cape Province. These issues are the uneven institutionalisation of the provincial 
House of Traditional Leaders, traditional authorities and gender politics, and the vexed 
questions of land ownership and development. 8 
 
2. The challenges and opportunities of the administrative and institutional 
reconfiguration of the country  
 
The period 1990-1996 was characterised by the pressing need to deliver a workable political 
compromise that was based on a negotiated transfer of political power at the national level, 
with considerable mistrust and political intrigue between the negotiating parties. There 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
relatively autonomous governmental institutions’. R. Sklar (1994) as quoted in Bank and Southall, ‘Traditional 
Leaders In South Africa’s New Democracy’, p. 407. 
7 J-F. Bayart, The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly (London, Polity Press, 1993). 
8 X. Xundu, Foreword in P. Holomisa, According to Tradition. A Cultural Perspective on Current Affairs. 2nd 
edition (Johannesburg, Real African Publishers, 2012); See J. Beall, S. Mkhize and S. Vawda, ‘Emergent 
Democracy and ‘Resurgent’ Tradition: Institutions, Chieftaincy and Transition in KwaZulu-Natal’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 31,4 (2005) pp. 755-771, see p. 760; L. Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised: Chiefs 
and The Politics of Land in South Africa (Leiden, Brill Academic Publishers, 2005).  P. Delius, ‘Contested 
terrain: land rights and chiefly power in historical perspective’, A. Claassens, and B. Cousins, 
(eds.), Land, Power and Custom: Controversies generated by South Africa’s Communal Land Rights Act (Cape 
Town, UCT Press, 2008), pp. 211–237. 
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followed a period in which the institutions, spheres and processes of governance were either 
amalgamated, reshaped or established for the first time. In the process, nine new provinces 
and 834 local government structures were established. Both the provinces and the often 
economically impoverished local government structures posed serious challenges, but also 
opportunities, for institutionalising inclusive, democratic governance.9  
 In hindsight, it is possible to see how this fractious and politically fluid period 
presented nimble-footed political operators, personified by the likes of Advocate Chief 
Phatekile Holomisa, MP (ANC) and President of the ANC-aligned10 Congress of Traditional 
Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), and others like Chief Mwelo Nonkonyane, with 
opportunities that they managed to exploit to the benefit of their organisation and its 
members. Indeed, these two were among a set of well-educated, articulate and – as Gibbs 
points out – well-connected individuals who proved adept at turning a period of uncertainty 
and transition to their political advantage. 11  They not only imbibed the tenets of the 
Contralesa Constitution of 1987 which committed the organisation “to unite all traditional 
leaders and to school them in the politics of liberation, to fight for the eradication of the 
Bantustan system, to win back the lands ‘stolen’ from their forefathers during colonialism, 
and to contribute to the struggle for a unitary, non-racial and democratic South Africa”, but 
they also worked tirelessly to reinsert themselves into both the ANC’s national leadership and 
its regional Xhosa leadership in the Eastern Cape. 
 
 
                                                          
9 This was in 1995. The number was reduced to 284 in time for the local government elections of 2000, L. 
Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised, p67. See T. Lodge. ‘Provincial Government and State Authority in South 
Africa.’ Journal of Southern African Studies 31, 4, (2005). pp. 737-753. 
10 SAIRR 1987/88:92, cited in L. Bank and R. Southall, ‘Traditional Leaders In South Africa’s New 
Democracy’ Journal of Legal Pluralism 37-38, (1996), pp. 407-430. See p. 415. 
11 T. Gibbs, ‘AH! DILINTZABA! “The One Who Breaks Down Barriers”: Phatekile Holomisa, a Networked 
Chief.’ Paper presented at the 2011 Critical Studies Seminar Series, the Departments of Politics and 
International Studies & Sociology, Rhodes University, 28 Sep 2011.  
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3. Three Presidents, three attempts to grasp the nettle that is traditional authority12  
 
When Nelson Mandela became president of South Africa in 1994, after decades of the 
organisation being banned and its leaders imprisoned or exiled, the ANC was 
organisationally weak, particularly in rural areas. It was specifically in the provinces in which 
Bantustan administrations had existed prior to 1994, that chiefs still wielded power, and 
asserted their ability to ‘deliver the rural vote’ (such as in KwaZulu-Natal, in the former 
Transkei and in Limpopo Province), and thus turn the ANC’s organisational weakness to 
their own advantage.13  
 In its early efforts to contain the attempts by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to 
foment full-scale civil war in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), and decisively to wrest rural power in 
that province away from the IFP’s Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the ANC made two 
concessions to the traditional authorities that Contralesa was quick to capitalise on.14A key 
concession was to recognise and accommodate the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini, 
within the KZN provincial sphere, while ensuring that his salary and lifestyle were 
underwritten by the national, ANC-led government. In time, this facilitated a shift in the 
political allegiance of the Zulu King from the IFP to the ANC and proved instructive for how 
the ANC might deal with traditional authorities in other provinces. The second concession 
was a commitment to finding a place for traditional authorities in the vexed sphere of local 
government and as an identifiable stakeholder in the politically sensitive and administratively 
                                                          
12 The short presidency of Kgalema Mothlanthe (25 Sep 2007 to 9 May 2008) is not considered here. 
13 T. Lodge, ‘Neo-patrimonial politics in the ANC’, in African Affairs, 113 (450), p. 17. 
14 J. Beall et al., ‘Emergent Democracy and ‘Resurgent’ Tradition’. 
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complex land reform programme. As President Mandela, a traditionalist and an admirer of 
the chiefs,15 increasingly ceded formal power to his deputy, the more technocratic Thabo 
Mbeki, a more contested political situation began to emerge: national reconciliation and the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) morphed into the neoliberal GEAR (the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution) macro-economic programme and a programme of 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) was legislated. Contestation within the ANC-led 
alliance over economic policy as well as Mbeki’s stance on HIV/AIDS and on the situation 
around land reform in Zimbabwe resulted in serious political tensions within the governing 
party and alliance.16  
 For traditional authorities, the modernising, rational instincts of Mbeki also caused 
disquiet: Mbeki shocked the chiefs and their supporters when he set up the Nhlapo 
Commission17  to investigate who among them could be considered legitimate traditional 
authorities. While Mbeki was said to be ambivalent18 about this part of his African heritage, 
he could not ignore the role of chiefs in drumming up support for the ANC in rural areas. 
Thus several laws around traditional institutions and land ownership were passed, bolstering 
the traditional authorities but bewildering both scholars and rural supporters of the ANC. 
These laws included the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework (TLGF) Act of 
2003, the 2005 Provincial Traditional Leadership Act and the 2008 Traditional Courts Bill. 
The TLGF had arguably given traditional authorities more powers than they enjoyed under 
apartheid, as it effectively entrenched the traditional jurisdictions created during the 
                                                          
15 L. Bank and R. Southall, ‘Traditional Leaders In South Africa’s New Democracy’; T. Gibbs. Mandela’s 
Kinsmen. Nationalist Elites and Apartheid’s First Bantustan (Woodbridge, UK, James Currey, 2014). 
16 BBC News, ‘Thabo Mbeki’s Difficult Presidency’, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1296841.stm, retrieved on 30 June 2015. 
17 When the Commission’s report was released in 2010, it was widely criticized for, among other things, using 
questionable methodology for verifying the legitimacy of the traditional authorities under investigation. 
Eberhard, ‘The King, the ‘Nhlapo’ Commission and the Archive’ (2013), available at 
http://www.archivalplatform.org/blog/entry/the_king_the_nhlapo_commission_and_the_archive/, posted on 24 
October 2013, retrieved on 30 Dec 2014. 
18 M. Gevisser. Thabo Mbeki. The Dream Deferred. (Jeppestown, Jonathan Ball, 2007). p.13, p.700ff. 
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formation of the homelands and many rural people who did not recognise these jurisdictions 
voiced their dissatisfaction.19  
While political networks at national level and in the provinces began to voice frustration with 
the direction of economic policy, disquiet in rural areas over dysfunctional local government 
helped to strengthen the position of traditional authorities. When the ‘delivery’ of services 
and employment proved slow, the volatile central region of the ANC in the Transkei, already 
sympathetic to the ANC’s prodigal son, Bantu Holomisa and his United Democratic 
Movement (UDM), switched allegiances from Mbeki to his arch-rival, Jacob Zuma.20 By 
2005, Mbeki’s assorted enemies, among them committed ‘leftists’ in the trade union 
movement, right-leaning populists like Zuma, and others like ANC Youth League leader 
Julius Malema, were mounting a concerted and deeply divisive campaign to unseat him as 
ANC president. The ANC national conference at Polokwane in 2007 was to be his 
ignominious undoing.21  
 Following Mbeki’s removal, and under the neo-traditionalist presidency of Jacob 
Zuma (2009- ), traditional authorities have managed to consolidate key gains made in the 
early years of their political resurgence. Under Zuma, a national Department of Traditional 
Affairs was established, and equivalent provincial departments followed. This signalled 
institutional recognition of a kind that would have been impossible to orchestrate even a 
decade earlier, when the hostility of ‘civics’ represented a serious threat to the existence of 
traditional authorities. Although a National Council of Traditional Leaders had been 
established in 1997 (and changed in 1998 to the National House of Traditional Leaders), it 
                                                          
19 A. Claassens, ‘Denying Ownership and Equal Citizenship: Continuities in the State’s Use of Law and 
‘Custom’, 1913-2013’ in Journal of Southern African Studies 40, 4, (2014), pp. 761-779; C. Walker. ‘Piety in 
the Sky? Gender Policy and Land Reform in South Africa’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 3, 1&2 (2003), 
pp.113–148. 
20 G. Ruiters (ed.), The Fate of the Eastern Cape. 
21 H. Marais, South Africa Pushed to the Limit. The Political Economy of Change (Cape Town, UCT Press, 
2010). 
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was now given further endorsement and impetus by the president. Provincial Houses of 
Traditional Leaders were finally set up in all six provinces where traditional authorities were 
formally recognised. 
 Although a far more conciliatory and inclusive approach is generally evident in the 
relations between government officials and traditional authorities, in July 2010, it was 
Zuma’s unpleasant task to preside over the findings of the Nhlapo Commission, set up by his 
predecessor. The Commission’s report, which was eight years in the making, was met with 
much dissatisfaction after only seven of the twelve kingships investigated were deemed to be 
legitimate. The controversies and appeals lodged against the findings of the Nhlapo 
Commission are partly responsible for a subsequent process set in motion in 2011 by the 
Zuma administration, namely the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and 
Claims, the remit of which in settling disputes extends down to the lower levels of traditional 
authorities (i.e. headmen).22 
 
4. The ANC in government and the possible courses of action for Traditional 
Authorities  
 
As noted above, important questions persist about whether a greater role for traditional 
authorities is constitutionally appropriate, but the question of fiscal sustainability is also 
relevant. Their contemporary position remains essentially one of perpetual rent-seeking, that 
is, they need State-provided salaries, medical aid and pensions, and allowances to maintain 
even modest local administrations.  
                                                          
22 N. Tolsi, ‘Power and patronage in Pondoland’, Mail and Guardian, 29 Jul 2011, available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2011-07-29-power-and-patronage-in-pondoland, retrieved 30 December 2014. 
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Clearly, where central governments prove reluctant to cede to them local powers of 
taxation, traditional authorities are rendered vulnerable to co-option by government. Indeed, 
this was the colonial and ‘grand apartheid’ experience of traditional authorities in South 
Africa. However, an analysis based solely on who writes their paycheques may be too 
simplistic: if, as we suggest above, the influence of traditional authorities stems largely from 
hereditary power, then this in turn ultimately rests to a significant extent - if variable by 
region - on their control of rural land and thus of the rural people with a stake in that land. As 
such, their power is independent of political fashion and government paymasters. 23  
 It is important to recognise the ambivalence with which the ANC-led alliance has 
approached the question of traditional authorities.24 Van Kessel and Oomen go as far as to 
say that  
the ANC had no clear cut policy on chiefs. Although the institution as such was never 
officially denounced by the liberation movement, many leading figures in the ANC 
assumed that chieftaincy would either die of its own accord or otherwise would be 
abolished.25  
In the early 1990s, however, and with ‘the promise of delivering their 'block vote', chiefs 
assumed a new importance to the ANC: no longer [were they seen as] relics of a feudal past, 
but [as] strategic allies in the conquest of state power.’26 Indeed, in the run-up to the 1994 
elections, Nelson Mandela welcomed chiefs into the ANC fold, eager to ‘open up a divide 
                                                          
23 L. Ntsebeza, ‘Traditional Authorities and Democracy: Are we Back to Apartheid?’, in G. Ruiters (ed.)., The 
Fate of the Eastern Cape (2011). 
24 The ANC’s guidelines of 1988 noted that the new constitution [would] ensure that the “institution of 
hereditary rulers and chiefs shall be transformed to serve the interests of the people as a whole in conformity 
with … democratic principles”. L. Bank and R. Southall, ‘Traditional Leaders In South Africa’s New 
Democracy’, p. 425. 
25 I. Van Kessel and B. Oomen, 'One Chief, One Vote': The Revival of Traditional Authorities in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa’, African Affairs, 96 (1997), pp. 561-585. See p.565. 
26 Ibid. p571: ‘In 1990, Contralesa was regarded as an important rural partner in the ANC's strategy to 'isolate 
De Klerk' by drawing all kinds of disparate forces into a broad alliance under ANC guidance. Chiefs were seen 
as constituting part of the middle ground between the ANC and the National Party government...’  
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between the [white] Nationalist government and its conservative African supporters’ in a 
period of unprecedented social change.27 
 The seemingly more innocuous route to steer traditional authorities was as custodians 
of culture and traditional practices in their specific cultural spheres. This might have been 
deemed appropriate and sufficient recognition for them in the new democratic dispensation. 
Here, it was envisaged, they would oversee traditional matters, such as local succession 
debates, cultural heritage, ritual ceremonies and calendrical events, and the entrenchment of 
indigenous languages.28 But this relatively minor role would not secure the political future of 
the institutions of traditional authority. Nor did it address wider concerns about the control of 
land and the rights of women in rural areas. Indeed, the underwhelming performance of 
traditional authorities in addressing the deaths and injuries during circumcision rituals in the 
Eastern Cape has caused some to seriously question the role of the institution even in the 
more limited sphere of cultural practice and heritage.29  
 The option of confining themselves to cultural matters was brushed aside by 
traditional authorities with the realisation that the near-vacuum in post-1995 rural local 
government represented a real opportunity for regaining lost ground.30  The compromises 
leading up to the 2000 local government elections provided for highly contested ‘wall-to-
wall’ local government that often pitted rural and urban civic movements, in the form of 
South African National Civic Association (Sanco) and ANC councillors, against each other 
for the limited council positions on offer. As important, the legislation in question provided 
for ex officio ‘observer status’ for women, traditional authorities and community 
                                                          
27 L. Bank and R. Southall, ‘Traditional Leaders In South Africa’s New Democracy’, see p. 416. Traditional 
authorities had an uneasy time of it at the early Codesa negotiations, and Contralesa was excluded (see below). 
28 As Phatekile Holomisa would have it: ‘As traditional leaders, [we are] the custodians of African morals, 
values, cultures and customs…’ P. Holomisa, According to Tradition, 2012, p.205. 
29 T. Kepe, ‘Secrets’ That Kill: Crisis, Custodianship And Responsibility In Ritual Male Circumcision In The 
Eastern Cape Province, South Africa’, Social Science & Medicine 70 (2010), pp. 729–735. 
30 J. Peires, ‘Traditional leaders in purgatory’.  
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organisations. Whereas a key objection to traditional authorities since 1994 has been their 
lack of accountability in processes of democratic governance, this concern was overshadowed 
by high levels of conflict within newly amalgamated rural local municipalities, their 
accountability and the ‘challenges’ of service delivery. Overwhelmingly, traditional 
authorities declined to take up their ex officio positions and chose instead to sit on the side-
lines of conflict-ridden local municipal councils whose squabbles animated the regional 
newspapers and damaged the credibility of local and national government.31  
 
Especially telling in this highly contested environment was the inability or unwillingness of 
the majority of newly elected municipal councillors to engage in meaningful debate and make 
decisions about land, easily the most significant rural asset, about agricultural development 
and the provision of rural agricultural infrastructure, mostly because they lacked the technical 
skills to make informed decisions, but also because they saw rural areas as post-agrarian 
spaces that required modernisation rather than more agricultural investments.  This opened 
the door for traditional authorities to re-assert themselves, especially among older rural 
constituencies in this key arena. Thus, the politically weakened traditional authorities found 
that they could again exert a measure of influence over the day-to-day lives of millions of 
rural South Africans resident largely in former ‘bantustan’ areas.32 This influence related 
mostly to obstructing and delaying decisions about where to situate much-needed rural 
infrastructure such as clinics and schools, fencing, amongst others, and the allocation of 
temporary but valuable employment opportunities in government-funded public works 
programmes.33 
                                                          
31 L. Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised, see pp. 66-7. 
32 Kepe notes that traditional authorities have, to all intents and purposes, no authority over their erstwhile 
‘subjects’ who reside in towns and cities in the Eastern Cape. T. Kepe, ‘‘Secrets’ That Kill.’ 
33 J. Bennett, A. Ainslie and J. Davis, ‘Contested Institutions? Traditional Leaders and Land Access and Control 
in Communal Areas of Eastern Cape Province, South Africa.’, Land Use Policy 32 (2013), pp. 27-38. 
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 The situation was exacerbated by the apparent wavering of the ANC: Ntsebeza34 notes 
that it took the ANC government almost ten years to formulate ‘laws that reasonably clarify 
the role of traditional authorities in rural areas.’ This was partly down to furious lobbying by 
chiefs behind the scenes, within government and the ANC itself. Whilst the Bill of Rights of 
the 1996 Constitution guaranteed the rights of individuals, it did not guarantee group rights, 
something that – given the apartheid divide-and-rule history of the country – was anathema to 
the ANC and other progressive forces. While the Constitution itself recognised the existent 
legally constituted traditional authorities and their continued supervision of indigenous laws 
and customs, subject to the Bill of Rights35, it did not specify the roles, functions and powers 
of the institution of traditional authorities – it only provided guidelines for legislative 
processes that would clarify these roles, functions and powers.36 
 As suggested above, because the nascent South African state was built on the 
institutional ruins of the failed apartheid project of ten ‘independent’ bantustans and ‘self-
governing’ homelands, there existed multiple fissures, contradictions and opportunities for 
brokers to take up politically useful and expedient roles. After their bitter disappointment at 
being excluded from a meaningful national role in the negotiations37 that led up to elections 
in April 1994, Contralesa chose to focus much of its organisational efforts at the provincial 
and local spheres and, indeed, within the ANC itself.  
 Observers like Ntsebeza and Oomen38  have noted that, starting with the national 
elections in April 1994, the build-up to each successive (national and local) elections saw a 
flurry of lobbying on the part of traditional authorities, who promised to deliver ‘the rural 
                                                          
34 L. Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised, see p.68. 
35 L. Bank and R. Southall, ‘Traditional Leaders In South Africa’s New Democracy’, p.409. 
36 L. Ntsebeza. Democracy Compromised, p.65. 
37 The ANC apparently thought their presence at the negotiations could play into the hands of their opponents, 
the National Party negotiators. 
38 L. Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised; B. Oomen, Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Power and 
Culture in the Post-Apartheid era (Oxford and New York: James Currey, 2005). 
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vote’ for the ANC in exchange for policy concessions which significantly advanced the cause 
of the chiefs. Their threat to boycott the November 1995 local government elections saw 
them squeeze concessions out of the government regarding their demands for more power at 
provincial and local levels. Davenport and Saunders give a sense of the stridency of their 
lobbying in noting that  
178 traditional leaders and healers met in Parliament in May 1995 to present their case [on 
the inclusion of powers for traditional authorities in the final constitution]. The delegation 
included six kings from the Eastern Cape, three paramounts [chiefs], seven princes, sixty-
four chiefs, among them fifteen women.
39  
In reality, quite how central the chiefs have been over the past twenty years in delivering the 
rural vote, remains a moot point and this no doubt varies considerably from region to region. 
It seems the ANC prefers not to test this, perhaps on account of its own institutional malaise. 
Speaking in 2012, the respected political commentator, Somadoda Fikeni, pointed to how 
internally destabilised the ANC had become, how rife it was with factionalism, nepotism and 
careerism and how, in the clamour for state patronage, the organisation was in danger of 
cannibalising itself.40 Elected local council structures remain locked in perpetual internal 
strife over control of budget allocations, the awarding of government tenders and the filling 
of key administrative positions. Indeed, the image of the (mostly) dignified, articulate king or 
chief now stands in sharp contrast to the nepotism and unseemly outbreaks of thuggish 
violence at often shambolic provincial conferences.41 This is the arena in which the likes of 
Phatekile Holomisa, president of Contralesa, ANC MP and, since May 2014, the  Deputy 
                                                          
39 R. Davenport and C. Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 
pp.578-9. 
40 S. Fikeni, ‘Public lecture to the Democracy Development Programme’, Durban, 14 August 2012, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWW9TXaKEt4, retrieved 20 April, 2014. 
41 M. Pietersen and M. Letsaolo,‘ANC’s top six wade into OR Tambo chaos’, Mail and Guardian, 15 August 
2012, available at http://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-15-ancs-top-brass-orders-continuation-of-or-tambo-
conference, retrieved 26 December 2014. N. Mkhize, ‘ANC Region delays conference again’, Business Day 
Live, 18 Dec 2014, available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/politics/2014/12/18/anc-region-delays-
conference-again, retrieved 30 December 2014.  
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Minister of Labour, exhort (especially rural) people to consider what may be lost forever in 
the headlong rush to adopt all things ‘Western’.42 
 The highly symbolic politics of land reform has also offered rich pickings to the 
traditional authorities. In opposing the government’s attempts – signalled by the publication 
of a White Paper on Land Policy in 1997 - to push forward with the land redistribution 
programme, traditional authorities asserted the claim of Tribal Authorities to be legal 
corporations in their own right and claimed that they were therefore not obliged to register 
with the state. They won plaudits from Africanists (including the Pan Africanist Congress) 
for rejecting 1913 as the earliest date from which claims for the restoration of land to 
Africans was to be considered.43 The ruling party’s response was to fudge the key issues, to 
court the vocal Contralesa spokesmen, and in the process to add considerably to the 
frustration of its own Department of Land Affairs officials and of many progressive land and 
gender activists who had supported the state’s land reform programme.44 In the sections that 
follow, we show –  with particular reference to the Eastern Cape Province –  that the initial 
caution with which the ANC in government approached traditional authorities has been 
replaced by zeal. We demonstrate particularly how traditional authorities assert their opinions 
in day-to-day politics, even where these opinions are in opposition to key democratic 
principles enshrined in the Constitution. We focus on three short case studies, viz. the 
activities of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders, the issue of gender and 
traditional institutions, and questions of land administration and development in rural areas. 
We find that a common thread running through these cases is the instrumental nature of the 
                                                          
42 P. Holomisa, According to Tradition. 
43 R. Davenport and C. Saunders, South Africa: A Modern History, p.579. 
44 A. Claassens, ‘Who Told Them We Want This Bill? The Traditional Courts Bill And Rural Women’, Agenda 
23, 82, (2009), pp. 9-22. Walker noted that ‘[T]he DLA’s reluctance to confirm the claims of traditional leaders 
and tribal authorities to own communal land on behalf of their subjects presented the ANC with awkward 
political choices, which it was reluctant to address…the ANC’s manoeuvrings around the amakhosi have 
effectively blunted its commitment to gender equity in rural affairs – gender equity is a principle of government 
more readily endorsed in the urban context.’ See C. Walker, ‘Piety in the Sky?’, p.120. 
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debates and the limited space allowed for the public, particularly for rural people, to freely 
articulate their views on the relevant issues.  
 
4. The Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders (ECHTL) 
 
Despite the setbacks that traditional authorities have faced since 1990, what is clear is that 
resurgent traditional authorities have become a political force at the national level and by 
extension, also in the five provinces where they enjoy constitutional recognition. 
Evidence of this is the establishment in 2010 of the national Department of Co-operative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), with its own Minister. COGTA has since 
been renamed the Department for Traditional Affairs (DTA) and had its administrative brief 
extended. It oversees the relationships between traditional authorities and other government 
departments and ‘spheres’ of government, including provincial governments through 
MINMEC meetings. DTA also holds workshops to address their specific needs for training 
(including enhancing their knowledge of the Constitution), empowerment and material ‘tools-
of-the-trade’ (i.e. financial rewards). 45  It aims to support their efforts to transform and 
reconstitute traditional councils and to provide guidance for the participation of traditional 
authorities in local government. Significantly, DTA policy documents show this to be a 
symbiotic relationship, which also underwrites ‘building the capacity and the capability of the 
DTA to support the traditional affairs institutions…in the promotion of good governance and 
the enhancement of democracy.’ 46 
                                                          
45 M. Sibandze, ‘Framework For The Provision Of Enabling Resources For A Member Of The National House 
Of Traditional Leaders, A Member Of Any Provincial House Of Traditional Leaders And Traditional Leaders’, 
Presentation To The Portfolio Committee on Traditional Affairs, [Powerpoint presentation], 10 September 2013, 
available at https://pmg.org.za/files/130910dta.ppt, retrieved 30 December 2014. See A. Makinana, ‘Chiefs Tire 
of Cheap Frills and Sackcloth,’ Mail &Guardian, 13 June 2013, available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-09-13-
00-chiefs-tire-of-cheap-frills-and-sackcloth, retrieved 30 December 2014. 
46 M. Sibandze, ‘Framework For The Provision.’  
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In 2014, evidence indicating the extent of the changed fortunes enjoyed by the 
traditional authorities in the Eastern Cape included the fact that the Provincial Department of 
Local Government, Human Settlement and Traditional Affairs had ‘1,590 posts that support 
Traditional Affairs and in consequence, the Province [has] reviewed its structure and 
proposed an elevation from a Chief Directorate to a Branch level (DDG)’.47 The EC House of 
Traditional Leaders (ECHTL), under the Chairpersonship of Chief M.J.N. Matanzima, with 
its nominated and (some) elected 38 members48 sits in a new, ‘state of the art’ building in the 
provincial capital, Bhisho. The House enjoys the ‘best support of any province’ in its ‘sound 
relationship and strong partnership’ with the EC Provincial Government, demonstrated in an 
annual budget in excess of R8,7million, including generous ‘tools-of-the-trade’ packages for 
its members and for the administration of the House.49  
Some would argue that this is not all that surprising, since many ‘mature’ democracies 
tolerate (costly) constitutional monarchies with inherited privilege of one sort or another. 
What is surprising, however, given the engagement of the provincial government with the 
House, is how ill-defined and nebulous in reality the role and work of the ECHTL is. Take 
the example of just one of the six Committees of the ECHTL, the important Rural 
Development and Agrarian Reform, Economic Development and Land Affairs (Agriecola) 
Committee. According to the relevant legislation, this Committee is responsible for 
(emphasis added):  
providing support to government departments and other organs of state [in the delivery of] 
food security and livestock improvement programmes; participating in the land use 
management programme; promoting protection of the environment and awareness 
programmes to that effect thereof; supporting promotion of protection of eco-and cultural 
                                                          
47 M.C. Nwaila, ‘Overview of the Dept of Traditional Affairs’, Eastern Cape, 29 October 2013, Department of 
Traditional Affairs/National House of Traditional Leaders. [Powerpoint presentation]. (2013). Professor Nwaila 
is the Director-General of the Department of Traditional Affairs. 
48 There are six full-time members of the Executive Committee of the ECHTL. 
49 M.C. Nwaila, ‘Overview of the Dept of Traditional Affairs’. 
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tourism; [and] endeavour[ing] to accelerate participation of Traditional Leaders in rural 
development initiatives by engaging Departments with the same competency. 50  
 
Simply put, these are all rather broad, vague responsibilities and it is not clear how, when and 
by whom they will be operationalised. Our attempts to get information on what exactly the 
ECHTL does were unsuccessful. The limited responses we received from officials in the 
House led us to conclude that other than commenting on the male circumcision ritual, visiting 
initiates in the troubled rural areas, as well as fighting for recognition and power within the 
province, there is as yet no clear role for the ECHTL that justifies the budget allocated to it. 
 In the next section, we consider the issue of gender politics and the rights of women 
under customary law in the post-1994 political dispensation.  
 
5. Traditional authorities and gender politics 
 
Gender politics have come to characterize some of the key controversies involving the 
institution of traditional authorities and the issue of gender equality has presented the ANC in 
government with a dilemma. This is because the Constitutional endorsement of the institution 
of traditional authorities, and the enshrinement of cultural rights (Sections 30 and 31 of the 
Constitution) have rendered traditional authorities’ patriarchal, and sometimes 
unconstitutional, views and actions in relation to women, immune to political and legal 
reprimand. In this section we review a few examples relating to the fraught politics of gender 
in the Eastern Cape, both to illustrate the apparent brazen disregard of women’s constitutional 
rights by traditional leaders, and how the absence of official reprimand against these 
patriarchal and sexist views and practices seem to be central to their subsequent political 
boldness. 
                                                          
50 M.E. Nkantsu, ‘Standing rules and orders of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders’. As amended and 
adopted by the House on 28 October 2011. (Bhisho, ECHTL, 2011). 
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 There is a clear tension between the principles of gender equality and some cultural 
rights that are enshrined in the Constitution. 51 Some cultural practices threaten, and often 
violate, the rights of women (e.g., land rights) and this violates Section 9(3) of the 
Constitution, which enshrines equality and non-discrimination based on gender, among other 
things. 52  Over the past decade, positions articulated by powerful traditional authorities 
concerning the role of women within different cultures in the Eastern Cape Province provide 
an illustration of these tensions and how these play an important role in traditional 
authorities’ campaign to be heard. Some examples that illustrate this are discussed below. 
 First, in 2013 when Nelson Mandela lay on his deathbed, his family was feuding over 
who should control the Mandela household after his passing.53 On the one hand, there was 
Mandla Mandela, Nelson Mandela’s eldest grandson. Mandla has been acting as the chief of 
Mvezo area. This was where Nelson Mandela had grown up and was supposed to take over as 
chief, before he chose to abandon that right and pursue the struggle for the liberation of South 
Africa. On the other hand, there was Makaziwe Mandela, Nelson Mandela’s oldest living 
(female) child from his first marriage. With both wanting to control the Mandela household, 
others felt compelled to weigh in, starting with Mandela’s second wife Winnie Madikizela-
Mandela, who argued that Makaziwe, Zenani and Zindzi, Nelson Mandela’s only living 
children, should be allowed to take control of the Mandela family affairs. Winnie earned a 
sharp rebuke from the AbaThembu royal house, from which Mandela came, arguing that, 
under the customary rules of primogeniture, Mandla is the only point of entry into Mandela’s 
household. Chief Mfundo Mtirara, the AbaThembu royal house spokesperson, put it more 
                                                          
51 C. Walker, ‘Uneasy Relations: Women, gender equality and Tradition.’ Thesis Eleven, 115, 1, (2013), pp. 77-
94. 
52 A. Claassens, ‘Resurgence of tribal levies: double taxation for the rural poor’, South Africa Crime Quarterly, 
35, (2011). pp. 11-16. 
53 S. Boya and L. Feni, ‘Mandla is Mandela Head, say Traditional Experts’ Daily Dispatch, 20 December 2013; 
A. Laing, ‘Mandela Family Continues Feud.’ Daily Dispatch, 7 January 2014. 
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bluntly when he said, ‘Leadership goes from father to son’.54 Xolile Ndevu, Contralesa’s 
general secretary, clarified their position by saying ‘Mafungwashe (the first-born daughter) 
does not lead any traditional ceremonies. There must be a man for that’.55 Other powerful 
traditional authority figures, as well as politicians and state officials, were conspicuously 
silent on this intervention. 
 Second, over the past few years there has been public controversy regarding the 
appointment of women as traditional leaders. One of the high profile cases involved 
NomaXhosa Sigcawu, a princess of the AmaXhosa people. Following the death of her 
brother, King Xolilizwe Sigcawu, in 2005, the throne passed to her nephew, Prince Mpendulo 
Sigcawu, and she lodged a case with the Gender Commission on Equality. She argued that 
she is the rightful heir to the throne of AmaXhosa nation, and that she was passed over for the 
throne because she is a woman.56 Significantly, she received no public support from any 
traditional authorities.  
 Finally, there is the case of Nolitha Ludidi, who was appointed as the first female 
AmaHlubi chief in October 2014. The traditional leader of AmaHlubi people, Langalibalele II 
Rhadebe, does not recognise Ludidi’s leadership role, arguing that ‘No woman has ever been 
appointed permanently as chief’.57 Sicelo Rhadebe, the traditional leader’s spokesperson, 
tried to explain their opposition to the chieftaincy of Ludidi by saying ‘There is no 
discrimination; it is just custom. In our custom there are specific roles for women and men 
and there is a reason for that. It would be unfair for the Constitution to abolish our custom’.58 
Ludidi is only the third female chief in the Eastern Cape.  
                                                          
54 S. Boya and L. Feni, ‘Mandla is Mandela Head.’   
55 Ibid. 
56 L. Feni, ‘Not Traditional to have Women Lead’, Daily Dispatch, 16 August 2011. 
57 L. Feni, ‘Appointment of Female Chief Shunned by Leader’, Daily Dispatch, 11 October 2014. 
58 Ibid.  
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 In a controversial move, Chief Phatekile Holomisa, the president of Contralesa, lashed 
out at women who seek to become traditional leaders, arguing that it was not customary 
practice. Holomisa defended his position by arguing that: ‘this is not unfair discrimination or 
inequality, but a custom. Traditional leadership is about custom’.59 He went on to argue that 
equality as enshrined in the country’s Constitution was not randomly applicable. Holomisa’s 
interpretation of the equality clause in the Constitution is what is puzzling about his position 
because he is a lawyer and a senior member of government. Nowhere in the Constitution does 
it state that the equality clause is subject to ‘custom’. Rather, the equality principle is above 
all other rights that are contained in the Bill of Rights (See Section 9 of the Constitution). 
Again, there was no official censure of these views, which clearly contradicted sections of the 
Bill of Rights. 
 The main issue with these examples of deep bias against women on the part of 
traditional authorities is not that such views exist, but it is the silence on the part of those who 
are supposed to defend the constitutional rights of all South Africans. It is likely that this 
silence fosters the impression among the public that traditional authorities have power that 
matches or even exceeds that of elected politicians.  This is because if such views about 
women were to be promoted by elected politicians, one might expect immediate censure, 
including calls for their resignation. We argue that this sense of invincibility on the part of 
traditional authorities is not good for democracy, but it is certainly something that, if not 
addressed, will undermine the rights of ordinary South Africans. In short, by publicly 
expressing conservative and sometimes sexist views about gender equality, without being 
challenged, traditional authorities can only but count their position on gender as another 
victory in their struggle for recognition. Thus, the price the ANC may be paying for 
                                                          
59 L. Feni, ‘Not Traditional to have Women Lead.’ 
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traditional leaders delivering the rural votes is enhanced chiefly control over gender 
discourse, which may come back to haunt the party in the future. 
 
 
6. Traditional authorities, the land and development in rural areas 
In 2004, Chief Phatekile Holomisa wrote:  
Our advice to Government is that legal title to communal land [should] be in the name of 
the relevant traditional authority. Failing to do so would further erode the role of traditional 
leaders in the life of our people, and would serve to cut the ties among the land, the people 
and their ancestors who bequeathed the land to us.60  
He also made the following statement: ‘The institution of traditional leadership is inextricably 
intertwined with the land’.61 These two statements by Holomisa aptly capture a central source 
of the conflict and confusion relating to traditional authorities and the democratic state in 
South Africa. Traditional authorities believe that the post-apartheid era has effectively 
stripped them of responsibilities and powers they had in rural areas, particularly their control 
over land. According to Phago and Netswera, 62  without controlling land, traditional 
authorities rightly feel their role in rural development is undermined. Shabangu and Khalo63 
argue that a source of conflict is that during apartheid, traditional authorities performed 
similar duties as those prescribed for elected local government representatives as laid out in 
Sections 152(b) and 153(a) of the Constitution. Even when the government sought to clarify 
the roles of traditional leaders in Section D 4.1 of the White Paper on Local Government 
(1998), these were mainly about presiding over traditional courts, village conflicts, and 
                                                          
60 P. Holomisa, ‘Securing Rights on Communal Land’ in M. Roth, V. Nxasana, S. Sibanda and T. Yates (eds.), 
Finding Solutions, Securing Rights in South African Land Tenure Reform (Durban: Lexis Nexis Butterworth, 
2004),  pp. 113-117. See p.115. 
61 P. Holomisa, ‘Securing Rights on Communal Land’. See p. 114. 
62 K.G. Phago and F.G. Netswera, ‘The Role of traditional leadership in a developmental state: the case of 
greater Sekhukhune district municipality of South Africa’, Journal of Public Administration 46, 3 (2011), 
pp.1023-1038. 
63  M.H. Shabangu and T. Khalo, ‘The Role Of Traditional Leaders In the Improvement Of the Lives Of 
Communities In South Africa’, Journal of Public Administration, 43, (2008), pp. 324-338. 
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advising government on traditional affairs. The closest these recommendations came to 
dealing with land and development were suggestions of ‘making recommendations on land 
allocation and settling of land disputes’, as well as ‘lobbying government and other agencies 
for development in their areas’.64  
 With regard to land, the role of chiefs in the land stemmed from the entrenchment of 
communal land rights in the Native Reserves prior to 1948, something that placed chiefs 
squarely at the centre of land allocation in the reserves. With increasing land shortages, chiefs 
and headmen became ever more important in land allocation for homesteads and arable 
production, a phenomenon that Ntsebeza argues still exists today.65 He contends that the 
continuing role of traditional authorities in land allocation relates to the lack of progress with 
land reform in rural areas, and the failures of local government in this regard. Given this 
situation, rural people are simply being pragmatic in turning to traditional authorities in order 
to access land. Reasserting their de facto role of land allocation in rural areas, traditional 
authorities view it as one of the bases of their power that constantly reminds both the public 
and government of their presence in these areas. 
Bennett et al. 66 argue that the Communal Land Rights Act (CLARA) that was passed 
in 2004 was meant to end the confusion over land administration, by suggesting that land be 
transferred to ‘communities’, represented by a land administration committee. It was up to 
communities to decide whether this committee would be democratically elected or whether 
an existing ‘traditional council’ should assume this role. CLARA was heavily criticized for 
being unconstitutional and for allowing unelected traditional authorities to retain control over 
local land rights. Following a Constitutional Court challenge, CLARA was withdrawn in 
                                                          
64 Ibid. 
65 W. Beinart (1982) as cited in Bank and Southall, ‘Traditional Leaders In South Africa’s New Democracy’. L. 
Ntsebeza, ‘Democratic Decentralisation and Traditional Authority: Dilemmas of Land Administration in Rural 
South Africa.’ European Journal of Development Research, 16, 1, (2004), pp. 71-89. 
66 J. Bennett et al., ‘Contested Institutions?’.    
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2010. 67  However, given that senior traditional authorities hold powerful positions in 
government, there remains an accommodating platform for them to air their grievances about 
their role and powers relating to the land in rural areas.68  
 With respect to development in rural areas, how traditional authorities get involved in 
development in rural areas varies from place to place, depending on a number of issues, 
including, but not limited to, the political climate in the area. Bank argues that despite the 
rhetoric of co-operative governance being promoted by the Comprehensive Rural 
Development Programme unveiled in 2009, there is still a great deal of tension in the Eastern 
Cape between traditional authorities and elected local government structures around 
development.69 He argues that there is a widely held belief among government officials that 
traditional authorities block development projects simply to discredit elected representatives, 
while municipalities are said to limit development in areas where traditional authorities 
appear to be vocal and strong.  
 There are several reasons to suggest that land administration and rural development 
are both key issues that traditional authorities are using to claw back some of the powers they 
lost in 1994. First, land tenure reform in South Africa, as exemplified by the withdrawn 
Communal Rights Act of 2004, is primarily applicable in rural areas, and is essentially about 
who holds land and how. The failure of the land reform programme to meet its goals in this 
regard simply makes the status quo with traditional authorities at the helm more real to 
pragmatic rural dwellers than the delays and uncertainty on the land issue. Second, as 
Ntsebeza has argued, elected local government in rural areas has been dysfunctional in the 
arena of development. While their role is still unclear in rural development, their accessibility 
to the poor rural residents, by virtue of living in these areas, enables traditional authorities to 
                                                          
67 C. Walker, ‘Uneasy relations’. 
68 J. Bennett et al., ‘Contested Institutions?’    
69 L. Bank, ‘Are Traditional Leaders Stalling Rural Municipal Development?’, Daily Dispatch, 13 May 2011. 
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facilitate information flow between development agencies and the people. Third, in rural 
areas, traditional authorities preside over areas occupied by the majority of the poor in South 
Africa.70 This presents them with an opportunity to use the poverty in these areas to draw 
attention to their own plight, while also arguing that they are the better alternative for 
facilitating rural development.71Again, as with the case of gender, reluctantly or not, the ANC 
government appears to be allowing traditional authorities a bigger voice in discourses about 
rural development and land administration. Ironically, it maybe these very discourses and 
practices by the chiefs that may gradually turn rural voters away from the ANC. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
It is clear that over twenty years after the political transition of 1994, the role of traditional 
authorities remains a deeply controversial and divisive work in progress. Traditional 
authorities have seized the opportunities and resources available to them to fight for 
recognition and, in the process, have secured a future for themselves as a real force in South 
Africa’s political landscape. 72  
Just how have the traditional authorities managed to this feat? The levers are many, but we 
have argued that they include the legacy of kinship, cultural and even personal ties of 
clanship, especially in the case of people like Nelson Mandela (and Jacob Zuma), who had 
always been sympathetic to the traditional authorities and sought to welcome them into the 
ANC fold after 1990. Also important is the realisation on the part of political parties that their 
                                                          
70 D. Tessaro and T. Kepe, 'Development’ at the crossroads: biodiversity and land use tensions on South 
Africa’s Wild Coast’ in International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology, 21(2014), pp. 
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access to rural voters is intertwined with respecting and acknowledging traditional authorities 
as ‘custodians’ of rural areas. 73  Indeed, the ANC’s ‘broad church’ approach to political 
mobilisation meant that it sought to incorporate under its umbrella all constituencies that 
could help it to electorally defeat its political opponents.  
 As we have argued above, the finely-balanced negotiations and protracted efforts to 
stave off violent conflict with the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal gave Contralesa valuable early space 
to manoeuvre within the ANC alliance.74  Linked to this, the determined, pragmatic and 
skilful leadership within Contralesa has enabled traditional authorities to carve out public 
space for their institution: they appear regularly in the media and the lavish Eastern Cape 
Provincial House of Traditional Leaders in Bhisho is a testament to their skill, as is the fact 
that elected politicians (notably provincial premiers and MECs75) can be found presenting 
their annual plans and budgets in this House. 
 It is a fact that many South Africans derive meaning from their African roots, values 
and customs, including some elements of culture that traditional authorities claim to embody. 
These values and customs also form part of the symbolic restoration of the dignity of black 
South Africans. But the extent to which some of these values clash with accepted, democratic 
principles of governance has drawn criticism from democrats within the ANC and other 
political parties who see the values embodied by traditional authorities as an expensive, 
retrogressive ‘ethnic project’.   
 The fact that traditional authorities have retained effective control over land allocation 
in significant areas of the Eastern Cape Province, is an important factor in their survival and 
                                                          
73 Statistics South Africa (SSA) went a step further: Their Advertorial Supplement in the Mail and Guardian of 
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74 L. Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised; C.Walker, ‘Piety in the Sky?’.  
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resurgence. It is clear that what has occurred is that traditional authorities have been co-opted 
into state patronage networks (specifically remuneration packages) that will render them both 
politically more compliant and, as demonstrated above, more publicly assertive.  
 The success that the chiefs have enjoyed must be set against the ongoing institutional 
incapacity, infighting and corruption within the local (and provincial) government. These 
have hampered central government’s attempts to deliver basic services to the poor in rural 
areas, such that central government have yielded to ‘transparently sectional interests’ for 
[some of] whom ‘tradition is little more than a shield from the demands of democratic 
accountability’. 76  The continued weak institutional capacity and low levels of civic 
mobilisation of the poor in rural areas, and especially of rural women who have arguably 
most to lose in the drift to a more patriarchal system, have made it more difficult to resist the 
resurgence of the traditional authorities through popular political action.  
 But there may be challenges ahead for traditional authorities: for one thing, the 
Traditional Courts Bill was defeated in February 2014, after it came under sustained attack in 
the National Council of Provinces, with strong opposition from political actors and civil 
society in several provinces.77 For another, the inability of the traditional authorities in the 
Eastern Cape to have any positive impact on the circumcision crisis is taken as clear evidence 
of the limits of their influence.78  Finally, the way in which government at national and 
provincial level has sought (and largely succeeded) to entice traditional authorities into its 
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web of influence and patronage can be expected to affect their standing and their prestige as 
an independent locus of power in future. The last word goes to Christina Murray: 
 
We must guard against the possibility that a new order revelling in its emancipation from 
(neo)colonial rule will abrogate its responsibility to its citizens in the name of a new 
Africanisation. The danger is that settlement with the lobby of traditional leaders will be a 
smokescreen for the failure to implement democracy where it really matters: at grassroots, 
in the material conditions of the ordinary existence of women and men.79 
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